# A Probe into Process-Level Attack Detection in Industrial Environments from a Side-Channel Perspective

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# Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

- control industrial processes;
- typically operate on critical infrastructures.

### Cyber-Attacks on ICS



## **The Problem**


- Attacks on ICS are increasing.
- Successful attacks on ICS
  - can be highly rewarding for attackers;
  - may have far-reaching consequences on society at large.
- Classical IT-based security is not sufficient.




# **Process-Level Attack Detection**

Why?	Because ICS combine both IT and OT technologies.
What?	Check if physical process deviates from the norm.
How?	By monitoring <b>process output</b> in real time.



















### ICS behavior is deterministic



### **ICS-Specific Features**

- Controllers (e.g., PLCs) operate in a cyclic manner.
- Signals repeat  $\Rightarrow$  level of **determinism** is relatively high.
- Normal behavior can be learned or modeled.

### ICS behavior is deterministic



## **ICS-Specific Features**


Controllers (e.g., PLCs) operate in a cyclic manner.
Regularity of ICS behavior enables data-driven approaches.

• Normal behavior can be learned or modeled.

Data-Driven Methods



# **Classical Approach**




Urbina, David I., et al. "Limiting the Impact of Stealthy Attacks on Industrial Control Systems." 2016 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.

### Data-Driven Methods



# **Classical Approach**



Urbina, David I., et al. "Limiting the Impact of Stealthy Attacks on Industrial Control Systems." 2016 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.



# PASAD

- solves an easier problem;
- In requires limited knowledge of system dynamics;
- is capable of detecting subtle changes in system behavior.

Wissam Aoudi, Mikel Iturbe, and Magnus Almgren. "Truth Will Out: Departure-Based Process-Level Detection of Stealthy Attacks on Control Systems." 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security.



# PASAD

solves an easier problem:


Learns normal behavior from historical data ↓ Measures to what extent present readings conform with the estimated dynamics.

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# PASAD

Prequires limited knowledge of system dynamics:

• It is entirely data-driven.

• Uses only **raw** sensor readings.


It is model-free.

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
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


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
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


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**Rationale:** Detect attacks on ICS by monitoring sensor measurements for unusual behavior.

PASAD works in two phases: Offline learning and online detection.



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- Construct Signal Subspace and project training vectors.
- Compute centroid of the cluster formed by training vectors.



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
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#### **Detection Phase:** Track distance from the centroid


- Project most recent measurement vector onto the subspace.
- Compute a *departure score*: distance from the centroid.
- Raise an alarm if a certain threshold is crossed.






Watch the full video at https://youtu.be/SSs4leM2MOs.






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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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




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#### Validation — Evaluation on Various Systems





#### Side-Channel Analysis



#### Rationale

- Under attack, industrial machines are poised to exhibit changes in physical properties.
- Mature sensor-level monitoring mechanisms are already available.
- Required hardware are cheap and widely available.

#### Side-Channel Analysis




#### Motivation

- Cost-efficient and easy to deploy.
- A complementary measure that adds security to the physical process.
- Isolated and unreachable monitoring system.
- Generates its own data.

#### System Design









#### Off-the-shelf and widely available.


- Microphone sensor.
- Vibration sensor.
- Load sensor.

## The metrics considered for the embedded system

- Computational performance.
- Amount of memory.
- The availability of analog-to-digital converter.
- Floating-point support.

#### **Experimental Results - Testbed Setting**







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#### Experimental Results - Testbed Setting





# 0 10000 ↑ 30000 50000 ↑ 70000 Algorithm run Algorithm run



## Experimental Results - Real Setting





## Tasks that required delicate engineering effort:

- Pre-processing analogue signals.
- Circuitry design and interfacing sensors.
- Implementing PASAD on the microcontroller.

#### More technical details in the paper.